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RECENT DEVELOPMENT 
LAWSON v. STATE: IT IS ADMISSIBLE FOR A SOCIAL 
WORKER ACTING WITHIN THE COURSE OF HER 
PROFESSION TO TESTIFY TO A CHILD DECLARANT'S 
OUT-OF-COURT STATEMENTS REGARDING CHILD 
ABUSE OR SEXUAL ABUSE OF CHILDREN OF TENDER 
YEARS WHEN THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE IS 
SATISFIED 
By: Alice Arcieri 
A social worker may testify to an out-of-court statement made to 
her by a victim of child abuse, when she is acting within the course of 
her profession, the child testifies at trial and is available for cross-
examination. Lawson v. State, 389 Md. 570, 886 A.2d 876. In 
addition, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that prejudicial 
statements admitted that are not properly cured during closing 
arguments constitutes plain error. Id 
In July 2002, Nigha, a seven-year-old female, told her mother, Ms. 
Thomas ("Thomas"), that a man had sexually molested her. Thomas 
reported the sexual abuse to the police and Nigha was examined by a 
doctor and interviewed by a social worker, Jennifer Cann ("Cann"). 
All three females testified at triaL Nigha described two distinct 
incidents. In 2001, Joseph Lawson ("Lawson") had been living with 
Nigha's family when the first abuse occurred. One night, Lawson 
exposed his genitalia to Nigha, pulled down her pants and penetrated 
her slightly. In June 2002, Nigha came home from school and Lawson 
was there, even though he no longer lived with her family. Lawson 
took Nigha into a bedroom and offered her soda in return for letting 
him touch her genitalia. Although Nigha refused, Lawson tried to pull 
down her pants. She told him to stop and left the room. She said she 
did not see his genitalia during that incident. 
At trial, Thomas and Cann testified to a similar account regarding 
the first incident, but the second incident was inconsistent. Thomas 
stated that Nigha told her that she saw Lawson's genitalia the second 
time and that he was wearing a condom. Cann testified that Nigha 
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spoke of three incidents of abuse including a statement that Lawson 
had penetrated her as well during the second incident. 
On July 8, 2003, the Circuit Court of Prince George's County 
convicted Lawson of two counts of second-degree rape, two counts of 
attempted second-degree rape and two counts of second-degree 
assault. Lawson appealed to the Court of Special Appeals of 
Maryland, which affirmed in part and reversed one count of second-
degree rape and attempted second-degree rape. The Court held that 
the social worker's testimony was admissible, the prosecutor's closing 
remarks were harmless and did not cause reversible error, and without 
corroborative evidence for the second allegation, that conviction was 
reversed. However, an out-of-court statement by Nigha who testified 
at trial was sufficient to convict Lawson on the first count. Lawson 
filed a writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals and the Court granted 
certiorari. 
The Court determined the out-of-court statements of a child to a 
social worker were admissible under the statutory interpretation of 
Section 11-304 of Maryland Criminal Procedure. Id. at 581, 886 A.2d 
at 882 (citing MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. Section 11-304(c)(4)). 
The Court held that Nigha's statements to Cann were admissible under 
the statute because she meets the tender years doctrine of being under 
twelve-years-old, her statements regarding sexual abuse were offered 
for the truth of the matter asserted, and the statements were given to a 
social worker acting in her professional capacity. Id. at 582, 886 A.2d 
at 883. Under this statute, the Court held that the social worker's 
testimony was admissible because the Confrontation Clause was 
satisfied based on Nigha's testimony at trial, even if her statements 
were testimonial. Id. at 589, 886 A.2d at 887 (citing MD. CODE ANN., 
CRIM. PROC. Section 11-304(d)-(f)); see State v. Snowden, 385 Md. 
64, 867 A.2d 314 (2005) (explaining the statute requirements of 
Section 11-304 under the Confrontation Clause). 
The Court of Appeals described the standard of review for 
reversible error, and stated that an appellate court will not reverse 
"unless that error is 'both manifestly wrong and substantially 
injurious'." Id. at 580, 886 A.2d at 882 (citing 1. W Berman Props. v. 
Porter Bros., 276 Md. 1, 11-12, 344 A.2d 65, 72 (1975)). The Court 
stated that in a criminal case, an error is harmless only if an appellate 
court decides "beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not in any 
way influence the verdict." Id. at 581, 886 A.2d at 882 (citing Dorsey 
v. State, 276 Md. 638, 659, 350 A.2d 665,678 (1976)). 
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The Court analyzed the prosecutor's closing remarks and 
determined whether the trial court interfered to cure any improper 
statements. ld. at 589,886 A.2d at 887. The Court stated that it would 
only reverse if the improper remarks "actually misled the jury or were 
likely to have misled or influenced the jury to the prejudice of the 
accused" and there was an abuse of discretion. ld. at 592, 886 A.2d at 
889 (citing Degren v. State, 352 Md. 400, 722 A.2d 887 (1999)). 
The Court explained each allegation and the holding of the Court of 
Special Appeals. Although the prosecutor used a "golden rule" 
argument, the Court of Special Appeals held that the general jury 
instructions cured any prejudice. ld. at 594, 886 A.2d at 890. 
Although the prosecutor used terms like "monster" and "sexual 
molester" in her closing remarks, the Court of Special Appeals held 
that the statements were isolated and did not directly refer to Lawson, 
so there was no prejudicial effect on the verdict. ld. at 597, 886 A.2d 
at 891-92. Although the Court of Appeals had not addressed the issue 
of future criminality in closing remarks, the Court of Special Appeals 
held that the statements were improper because they were not based on 
evidence at trial. ld. at 599, 886 A.2d at 893. 
Through this analysis, the Court of Appeals held that the 
prosecutor's improper statements should be evaluated as a whole. ld. 
at 600,886 A.2d at 893. The prosecutor shifted the burden on Lawson 
to prove that Nigha had a motive to lie, although Nigha's credibility 
was essential because she gave the primary evidence to convict 
Lawson. ld. at 596, 886 A.2d at 891. The prosecutor's indirect 
statements, "monster" and "sexual molester," were intended to 
describe Lawson, even without a direct reference to his name. ld. at 
599, 886 A.2d at 892-93. The prosecutor's allegation regarding 
Lawson's possible future molestation of an eleven-year-old boy living 
with him was highly prejudicial. ld. at 599, 886 A.2d at 893. Through 
this assessment, as a whole the improper closing remarks had a 
prejudicial effect which contaminated the jury's verdict. ld. at 604, 
886 A.2d at 895-96. 
U sing the factors in Spain, the Court held that there was less 
evidence with even more severe remarks and the trial court's actions 
to cure were insufficient. ld. at 600, 886 A.2d at 893 (citing Spain v. 
State, 386 Md. 145, 161, 872 A.2d 25, 34 (2005)). There was not 
overwhelming evidence against Lawson because both Thomas' and 
Cann's testimony were inconsistent with Nigha's testimony regarding 
the second allegation. ld. at 601, 886 A.2d at 894. Although there 
was sufficient evidence to convict, the verdict should have been based 
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on Nigha's credibility convincing the jury. Id. at 605, 886 A.2d at 
896. The continuous admission of prejudicial statements heavily 
weighed in favor of the conclusion that the jury's verdict was 
influenced. Id. at 600-01, 886 A.2d at 894. 
The trial judge's actions were inadequate to cure the prejudicial 
influence on the jury. Id. at 604, 886 A.2d at 896. The trial court 
overruled the objection regarding Lawson having the burden to prove 
Nigha had a motive to lie. Id. at 601, 886 A.2d at 894. In addition, 
the trial judge put only one paragraph in the jury instructions to 
convey that the lawyers' statements were not evidence, but only 
helpful to understand the application of law. Id. The same general 
instruction was sent back to the jury after closing remarks had 
concluded, but without any further explanation that it referred to the 
prosecutor's prejudicial statements. Id. The Court found that the 
judge's actions were insufficient, vague, allowed the statements to 
continue, and did not "overcome the likelihood of prejudice." Id. at 
603,886 A.2d at 895 (citing Hill v. State, 355 Md. 206, 226, 734 A.2d 
199, 210 (1999); Wilhelm v. State, 272 Md. 404, 423-24, 326 A.2d 
707, 720 (1974)). 
At the end of its analysis, the Court touched on the issue of 
corroborative evidence. Although this issue was moot based on the 
fact that it related to the second allegation, which was reversed by the 
Court of Special Appeals, the Court of Appeals held that corroborative 
evidence is not required in rape cases if the victim testifies. Id. at 606, 
886 A.2d at 897. Even if it were required, there was enough 
independent evidence to support Lawson's conviction in the first 
incident, based on the fact that Lawson had an opportunity to commit 
the crime. Id. at 607, 886 A.2d at 897. Nigha's testimony was 
corroborated by the social worker regarding the first incident and 
partially corroborated regarding the second. Id. at 607, 886 A.2d at 
897-98. In addition, Lawson admitted to knowing Nigha during the 
time of the crime and that he would come to the house when only the 
children were home. Id. Therefore, the jury had enough evidence to 
conclude that Lawson had an opportunity to commit the crime. Id. 
In this holding, the Court of Appeals of Maryland effectively 
explains the constitutional admissibility of the testimony of a social 
worker and other professionals, who are required under law to report 
statements of abuse received from a minor declarant. The public 
policy of this admission is to protect children from abuse, report and 
investigate allegations of abuse of children, and allow competent 
professionals acting in the course of their duties to testify along with 
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the victim in giving corroborative evidence. In addition, the Court is 
emphasizing the importance of giving every person an impartial trial 
and recognizing that when a trial judge's actions are inadequate to 
cure prejudicial effect, the appellate courts must intervene to correct 
this plain error. 
